In this paper, we propose a secure protocol for intervehicle communication (IVC) networks without the use of centralized roadside infrastructure. Future vehicles may use wireless IVC networks to exchange safety-critical information among each other. IVC networks do not have a centralized control, and instead rely on vehicles to coordinate with each other to exchange information.
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INTRODUCTION
The development and deployment of intelligent transportation system (ITS) technologies will reduce the risk of traffic accidents, improve safety, and solve traffic problems [1] [2] . ITS technologies will allow vehicles to exchange safety-critical information among each other via wireless inter-vehicle communication (IVC) networks. IVC networks will provide drivers with warnings and up such as, velocity, acceleration, position, and heading. IVC networks have no roadside infrastructure and instead, vehicles coordinate with each other to exchange safety-critical information securely and without any corruption of its contents.
In order for vehicles to receive safety-critical information from other vehicles, a level of trust among vehicles is necessary for the operation of IVC networks. Therefore, vehicles may only receive safety-critical information from other vehicles that are participants in IVC networks.
Participation can be a formal process that is controlled by authorities. Vehicles have to authenticate each other and verify that they are participants in IVC networks before exchanging safety-critical information. Besides vehicle authentication, IVC networks must provide mechanisms to guarantee that the contents of safetycritical information are authentic, unalterable, and not outdated. If the mechanisms are not provided, then the contents of safety-critical information can be forged, which may cause accidents and damages.
The challenges of vehicle and data authentication can be solved using cryptographic public-key algorithms, digital signatures, and public key infrastructure (PKI). Publickey algorithms provide users with two numbers, or keys, to exchange secure messages with other users. If one key is used for encryption, the other one can only be used for decryption, and vice versa. One of the keys is public and can be given to other users. The other key must be kept private and must not be revealed. Digital signature verifies the authenticity of a message. Digital signature uses hash functions in signing a message. Hash functions generate small fixed-sized message digest from the original one. Two messages cannot have the same digest when applying a hash function. After applying a hash function, the message digest is encrypted with the private key of the user. The encrypted digest is the signature of the owner of the message. Both, the encrypted digest and the original message are sent out to other users. To verify the signature, use the public key of the user who signed the message to recover the message digest. In addition, apply the same hash function to the original message to generate a message digest. If the two digest are equal, then the message is authentic.
PKI provides a level of trust between users of public keys. PKI is run by a trusted third party, the certificate authority (CA). The CA issues the public/private keys to users in a form of a certificate. The certificate contains information about the identity of the holder, the public key of the holder, the validity period, the certificate issuer name, and the encryption method used by the CA. The CA certifies the public key of the holder of the certificate by signing the certificate using digital signature techniques. X.509 [3] is an international standard that specifies the contents of a valid certificate.
The disadvantage of applying PKI to IVC networks is the privacy concern among drivers.
When vehicles authenticate each other, they first have to exchange their certificates. Then, vehicles will obtain the public key of other vehicles from their certificates and use it to authenticate and exchange messages in a secure channel. Since a public key is a constant value and associates itself to its owner, then drivers will be able to trace . Therefore, drivers will raise the privacy concern.
Several researchers have proposed solutions to protect the privacy of users of wireless networks [4] - [8] . The main idea is to change the value of the public key frequently. Hence, users of wireless networks will not be able to can be accomplished by establishing a secure wireless link with a roadside CA infrastructure. The CA will first authenticate the user that requests a change to its public key. If the CA cannot authenticate that user because a different CA issued the certificate, then CAs will communicate with each other to verify the authenticity of the user. Once the CA authenticate the user, then the CA will issue a new certificate with a new public key, and then transmit back to the user using the established secure wireless link.
In this paper, we propose a secure protocol for IVC networks without the use of roadside infrastructure. The protocol is based on the public-key RSA algorithm and the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). Our protocol solves the challenges of vehicle and data authentication while protecting the privacy of drivers.
BACKGROUND
In this section, we describe how RSA and DSA algorithms work. These two algorithms are the basis of our secure protocol in this paper.
RSA algorithm:
It is a public key algorithm that provides a pair of keys: a public key and a private key. If one of the keys is used for encryption, the other can only be used for decryption, and vice versa. RSA is named after three inventors: R. Rivest In other words, The integers ) , ( b a have the same remainder when divided by n.)
The public keys are e and n , while the private key is d .
The two primes p and q are no longer needed and must not be revealed. RSA gets its security from the difficulty of factoring the number n . If an attacker has one of the keys, e , and the number n , then to find the other key, d , the attacker has to factor the number n , which is difficult if n is very large (1024 bits). In this paper, we use RSA as a component for encrypting messages, decrypting messages, and generating the keys e and d . 
DSA:
The public keys are p , q , g , and y . The private key is x . To sign a message, m , a user generates a random number k less than q . Then the user computes:
The signature is ) , ( s r . To verify the signature, compute the following:
, then the signature is verified. In this paper, we use DSA as a component for signing messages, verifying signatures, and generating the public keys g and y , as shown in Figure 1 . 
DESCRIPTION OF OUR PROPOSED SECURE PROTOCOL WITH PRIVACY PROTECTION
In this section, we propose a secure protocol for use in IVC networks. We first describe how to use RSA and DSA algorithms to protect the privacy of drivers. Then we present in details our secure protocol that solves the challenges of vehicle and data authentication while protecting the privacy of drivers.
We use the following notations: Encryption of message M using key k
Decryption of message M using key k
To protect the privacy of drivers, we propose to arrange vehicles into several groups. Vehicles in a group will share one pair of public/private keys, and hence will share one certificate. Each group has a pair of public/private keys that is different from other groups. When a driver applies for a certificate, the CA will determine the group that this driver belongs to and provide an associated pair of public/private keys to the driver. The public key will be included in the group certificate. By arranging vehicles in groups, it is difficult to trace an individual vehicle in a group using the group public key. Hence, the privacy of drivers can be protected. for each vehicle in a group. Therefore, by maintaining this database, the authorities can identify malicious drivers. The process of identifying malicious drivers by the authorities is described in the next section. After obtaining the keys from the CA, a vehicle can now use DSA algorithm to generate its own public keys ) , (
, according to equations (2) and (3), as shown below
The public keys of vehicle 
IDENTIFYING DRIVERS
The advantage of using DSA algorithm is that the private key of a vehicle and the group public key of the vehicle are included in the signature process, according to equation (10). The authorities, using DSA algorithm, may identify those vehicles that transmit inaccurate safetycritical information. We assume that the public keys ) , , (
of a vehicle are transmitted with the safety-critical information. As shown in Figure 3 -a, a message m contains the certificate of the transmitter, a pubic key g generated by equation (2), a public key y generated by equation (3), and a public key q . The transmitter must first sign the message m using DSA, and then include the signature ) , ( s r and m in the transmitted message. When a vehicle receives a message, we assume that the public keys of the transmitter will be stored in a tamper-proof hardware inside the receiving vehicle. In addition, we assume that the message m and its signature are also stored in the tamper-proof hardware. Therefore, by obtaining Step 1: As shown in Figure 4 , Vehicle 
, a random number 1 a , and a request-to-join (REQ) field. The reason to include this random number is to ensure that the response from Step 2 is recent and not outdated. Vehicle This random number has a predefined lifetime. If its lifetime expires before Step 2, then this random number is considered invalid and will not be recognized.
Then, Vehicle belongs to this group can interfere with the handshake protocol and read the messages.
Step 2: As shown in Figure 4 , Vehicle V will initiate a new request to join the IVC networks.
Step 3: As shown in Figure 5 , If the authentication of Step 4: As shown in Figure 5 , If the authentication of m that contains the random number 2 a , and a symmetric key S . The symmetric key is used after the four authentication steps and when a vehicle is ready to broadcast safety-critical information to other vehicles. This symmetric key serves as part of message authentication during broadcast, as described in next section. Unlike RSA, one symmetric key is used to encrypt and decrypt messages. Figure 6 shows the steps to broadcast message 5 m from vehicle 1 1 G V to nearby vehicles using the symmetric key S . We assume that vehicles are equipped with a GPS device to achieve time accuracy and synchronization for message freshness. Vehicle 
Then, Vehicle

BROADCASTING SAFETY-CRITICAL INFORMATION
IDENTIFYING MALICIOUS DRIVERS WHO BROADCAST INACCURATE INFORMATION
To identify drivers who broadcast inaccurate safetycritical information using the symmetric key S , we assume that the symmetric key and the encrypted broadcasted message are stored in a tamper-proof hardware inside the receivers. As shown in Figure 8 , the authorities decrypt the message using the symmetric key S to get the original message 5 m and the encrypted message 6 m . From message 5 m , the authorities get the group public key Table I shows the number of RSA, DSA, and symmetric cryptographic operations in our proposed protocol. In general, cryptographic algorithms take a significant amount of time if the algorithms are implemented in software. To speed up the processing time, current advancements in technologies provide hardware cryptographic coprocessors for use in securing financial applications, e-commerce and SSL (Secure Socket Layer) transactions. These cryptographic coprocessors can perform 800 to 4000 RSA operations per second and can perform symmetric key operations at a rate of 5 Mbps to 500 Mbps [9] - [12] . Other coprocessors can perform 1250 DSA signatures per second and 620 DSA signature verifications per second [12] . In our proposed protocol, we will assume that IVC networks will use a cryptographic coprocessor that performs 4000 RSA operations per second, 1250 DSA signatures per second, 620 DSA signature verifications per second, and 10 Mbps symmetric operations. Table II shows the estimated processing time for our proposed protocol.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a secure protocol for IVC networks. Our secure protocol protects the privacy of drivers during vehicle authentication and broadcast. We proposed to use a combination of RSA and DSA algorithms to achieve privacy protection and vehicle authentication. We proposed to have the vehicles arranged in groups. Each group owns a unique pair of group public/private keys. We also proposed that each vehicle owns its unique private key. The keys are distributed and maintained by a CA. Therefore, it is impossible for drivers to trace each other because vehicles use a shared public key. However, since a unique private key is used in our secure protocol, only the authorities can identify the drivers who transmit inaccurate information via IVC networks. Our proposed authentication protocol is a 4-step handshake protocol. We showed that by using current technologies in hardware cryptographic coprocessors, our protocol could be processed in 13.15 ms. Similarly, the broadcast of secure safety-critical information could be processed in 3.7 ms. 
